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Abstract
Recently, Graph Neural Network (GNN) has achieved remarkable pro-
gresses in various real-world tasks on graph data, consisting of node
features and the adjacent information between different nodes. High-
performance GNN models always depend on both rich features and com-
plete edge information in graph. However, such information could possi-
bly be isolated by different data holders in practice, which is the so-called
data isolation problem. To solve this problem, in this paper, we propose a
Privacy-Preserving GNN (PPGNN) learning paradigm for node classifica-
tion task, which can be generalized to existing GNN models. Specifically,
we split the computation graph into two parts. We leave the private data
(i.e., features, edges, and labels) related computations on data holders,
and delegate the rest of computations to a semi-honest server. We con-
duct experiments on three benchmarks and the results demonstrate that
PPGNN significantly outperforms the GNN models trained on the isolated
data and has comparable performance with the traditional GNN trained
on the mixed plaintext data.
1 Introduction
Graph Neural Network (GNN) has gained increasing attentions from both academy
and industry due to its ability to model high-dimensional feature information
and high-order adjacent information on both homogeneous and heterogeneous
graphs [34]. GNN has a wide range of practical applications such as computer
vision [33], traffic prediction [26], fraud detection [22], and recommender system
[36].
An important ingredient for high-performance GNN models is high-quality
graph data including rich node features and complete adjacent information.
However, in practice, such information could possibly be isolated by different
data holders, which is the so-called data isolation problem. That is, due to
business competition or regulatory reasons, different data holders are unwilling
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Figure 1: The proposed PPGNN on vertically partitioned data.
or unable to share data with each other, thus the data actually exists in the form
of isolated islands [35]. Such a data isolation problem also presents a serious
challenge for developing other Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms. To this
end, how to design private AI algorithms becomes a hot research topic.
To date, kinds of privacy preserving machine learning models have been
designed for the data isolation problem, including decision tree [18], linear re-
gression [12], logistic regression [3, 5], recommender system [7, 6], and neural
network [32, 38]. Surprisingly, there is no existing work on privacy preserving
GNN yet. To fill this gap, in this paper, we present the first framework for
developing privacy-preserving GNN models. However, unlike previous privacy
preserving machine learning models that assume only samples (nodes) are held
by different parties and these samples have no relationship, our task is more
challenging because GNN relies on the relationships between samples, but the
relationship is also kept by different data holders.
Problem. Figure 1 shows a node classification problem under vertically par-
titioned data setting. Here, for simplification, we assume there are three data
holders (A, B, and C) and they have four same nodes. The node features are
vertically split, i.e., A has f1, f2, and f3, B has f4 and f5, and C has f6
and f7. Meanwhile, A, B, and C may have their own edges. For example, A
has social relation between nodes while B and C have payment relation between
nodes. We also assume A is the party who has the node labels. Note that one
can slightly modify Figure 1 to the horizontally partitioned setting [35], i.e.,
data holders have the same features and edge types but different nodes. The
problem is to build privacy preserving GNN models by using the graph data of
A and B cooperatively. In this paper, we take vertically partitioned setting for
example, and present how to build privacy preserving GNN models.
Naive solution. A direct way to build privacy preserving GNN is employing
advanced cryptographic algorithms, such as homomorphic encryption (HE) and
secure multi party computation (MPC) [23, 11], to build the training/inference
of GNN models. Such a pure cryptographic way can provide high security guar-
antees, however, it suffers high computation and communication costs, which
limits their efficiency, as analyzed in [24].
Our solution. Instead, we propose an efficient Privacy Preserving GNN (PPGNN)
learning paradigm. Motivated by the existing work in split learning [31, 24, 13],
we split the computation graph of GNN into two parts for privacy and efficiency
concern, i.e., the private data related computations carried out by data holders
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and non-private data related computations conducted by a semi-honest server.
Here, private data refers to node features, edges, and node labels, while the
non-private data refers to the encoded hidden representations.
Specifically, data holders first apply secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
techniques to compute the initial layer of the GNN using private node feature in-
formation collaboratively, which acts as the feature extractor module, and then
perform neighborhood aggregation using private edge information individually,
similar as the existing GNNs [30], and finally get the local node embeddings.
Next, we propose different combination strategies for a semi-honest server to
combine local node embeddings from data holders and generate global node
embeddings, based on which the server can conduct the successive non-private
data related computations, e.g., the non-linear operations in deep network struc-
tures that are time-consuming for MPC techniques. Finally, the server returns
the final hidden layer to the party who has labels to compute prediction and
loss. Data holders and the server perform forward and back propagations to
complete model training and prediction, during which the private data (i.e.,
features, edges, and labels) are always kept by data holders themselves. Here
we assume data holders are honest-but-curious, and the server does not collude
with data holders. We argue that this is a reasonable assumption since the
server can be played by authorities such as governments or replaced by trusted
execution environment [10].
Contributions. We summarize our main contributions as:
• We propose a novel PPGNN learning paradigm, which not only can be gen-
eralized to most existing GNNs, but also enjoy good accuracy and efficiency.
• We propose different combination strategies for the server to combine local
node embeddings from data holders.
• We evaluate our proposals on three real-world datasets, and the results demon-
strate our effectiveness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
background knowledge on security model, GNN, and a popular MPC technique,
i.e., secret sharing. In Section 3, we present our proposed privacy-preserving
GNN learning framework. In Section 4, we present the experimental results and
analysis. In Section 5, we review related work. Finally, we conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some preliminary techniques of our proposal, includ-
ing security model, GNN, and a popular MPC technique, i.e., secret sharing.
2.1 Security Model
In literature, there are two commonly used security model, i.e., honest-but-
curious (semi-honest) model and malicious model. The former has better effi-
ciency while the later has better security degree. Our proposed model is secure
against honest-but-curious (semi-honest) adversaries. That is, data holders and
the server strictly follow the protocol, but they also use all intermediate com-
putation results to infer as much information as possible. We also assume that
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the server does not collude with any data holders. This security setting is the
same as most existing works [23, 15].
2.2 Graph Neural Network
GNN extended existing neural networks for processing the data represented in
graph domains. The key of GNN is to learn a function f to generate node
embeddings hv for each node v in a graph based on its own features xv and
neighbors’ features xu, u ∈ N (v), withN (v) denoting the neighborhood function
in a graph [34]. After this, with the generated node embeddings, one can do
further tasks such as classification [16], link prediction [37], and recommendation
[36] using deep neural networks. In this paper, we focus on node classification
task. The key to this task is the design of aggregator function, which learns to
aggregate feature information from the node’s local neighborhood [39]. To date,
different types of aggregator functions have been proposed, e.g., convolution
based [14], gated mechanism based [17], and attention based [30, 21].
2.3 Additive Secret Sharing
Our proposal depends on Additive Secret Sharing [28]. Typically, we focus on
n-out-of-n Secret Sharing in this paper, i.e., all shares are needed to reconstruct
a secret, which has been popularly used in machine learning and data mining
[20, 6]. To additively share Shr(·) an `-bit value a for party i ∈ P = {1, ..., I},
party i generates {aj ∈ Z2` , j ∈ P and j 6= i} uniformly at random, sends aj
to party j, and keeps ai = a −
∑
j aj mod 2
`. We use 〈a〉i = ai to denote the
share of party i. To reconstruct Rec(·, ·) a shared value 〈a〉, each party i sends
〈a〉i to one who computes
∑
i ai mod 2
`. For simplification, we denote additive
sharing by 〈·〉 in this paper.
Multiplication and Vectorization. Existing research on secret sharing mul-
tiplication protocol are based on Beaver’s triplet technique [4]. Specifically, to
multiply two secretly shared values 〈a〉 and 〈b〉 between two parties P0 and
P1, they first need to collaboratively choose a shared triple 〈u〉, 〈w〉, and
〈z〉, where u,w are uniformly random values in Z2` and z = uw mod 2`.
They then locally compute 〈e〉i = 〈a〉i − 〈u〉i and 〈f〉i = 〈b〉i − 〈w〉i, where
i ∈ {0, 1}. Next, they run Rec(〈e〉0, 〈e〉1) and Rec(〈f〉0, 〈f〉1). Finally, Pi gets
〈c〉i = −i ·e ·f+f ·〈a〉i+e ·〈b〉i+〈z〉i as a share of the multiplication result, such
that 〈a〉〈b〉 = 〈c〉0 + 〈c〉1. It is easy to vectorize the addition and multiplication
protocols under secret sharing setting.
Apply to decimal numbers. The above protocols can not work directly
with decimal numbers, since it is not possible to sample uniformly in R [9].
We approximate decimal arithmetics following the existing work [23]. Suppose
a and b are two decimal numbers with at most lF bits in the fractional part,
to do fixed-point multiplication, we first transform them to integers by letting
a′ = 2lF a and b′ = 2lF b, and then calculate z = a′b′. Finally, we truncate the
last lF bits of z so that it has at most lF bits representing the fractional part,
with lF = 16 in this paper. It has been proven that this truncation technique
also works when z is secret shared [23].
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Figure 2: The proposed PPGNN on vertically partitioned data. PPGNN is
divided into three Computational Graphs (CG), i.e., private feature and edge
related computations (CG1, shown in red), non-private data related computa-
tions (CG2, shown in green), and private label related computations on data
holder (CG3, shown in blue). Besides, PPGNN has three key steps, i.e., gen-
erate initial node embeddings (Step 1), generate local node embeddings (Step
2), and generate global node embeddings (Step 3).
3 The Proposed Model
In this section, we first give an overview of the proposed privacy-preserving GNN
learning framework, which divides the computational graph of GNN into three
sub-graphs. We then present its three important modules, i.e., generating initial
node embeddings, generating local node embeddings, and generating global node
embeddings on server. Finally, we present how to learn the proposed model.
3.1 Overview of PPGNN
In practice, the data isolation problem can be mainly divided into two types
based on data split forms, i.e., horizontally partitioned data and vertically par-
titioned data. Take GNN for example, the former indicates the isolated data
holders have different nodes, but the same feature schema and edge type. While
the later denotes the isolated data holders have the same nodes, but different
feature schemes and edge types, as shown in Figure 1. Currently, users are
always active on different platforms at the same time, e.g., social platform and
e-commerce platform, which makes them have different feature schemes and
edge types. Therefore, vertically data split setting is more common in practice,
and we focus on this setting in this paper.
The first step in private machine learning under vertically data split setting
is secure entity alignment, also known as Private Set Intersection (PSI). That is,
data holders align nodes without exposing those that do not overlap with each
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other. PSI has been researched extensively in the prior work[25]. In this paper,
we assume data holders have aligned their nodes and are ready for performing
privacy preserving GNN training and inference.
As described in Section 1, for the sake of privacy and efficiency, we design
a novel Privacy Preserving GNN (PPGNN) learning paradigm by splitting the
computational graph of GNN into two parts. That is, we keep the private data
related computations to data holders for privacy concern, and delegate the non-
private data related computations to a semi-honest server for efficiency concern.
In the context of GNN, the private data refers to node features, labels, and
edges (node relations). To be specific, we divide the computational graph into
the following three sub-Computational Graphs (CG), as is shown in Figure 3.
CG1: private feature and edge related computations. The first step
of GNN is generating initial node embeddings using node’s private features,
e.g., user features in social networks. In vertically data split setting, each data
holder has partial node features, as shown in Figure 1. We will present how
data holders collaboratively learn initial node embeddings in Section 3.2. In the
next step, data holders generate local node embeddings by aggregating multi-
hop neighbors’ information using different aggregator functions, which we will
describe in Section 3.3.
CG2: non-private data related computations. We delegate non-private
data related computations to a semi-honest server for efficiency concern. First,
the server combines the local node embeddings from data holders with differ-
ent COMBINE strategies, and obtains the global node embeddings, which we
will further describe in details in Section 3.4. Next, the server can perform the
successive computations using plaintext data. Note that this part has many
non-linear computations such as max-pooling and activation functions, which
are not cryptographically friendly. For example, existing works approximate
the non-linear activations by using either piece-wise functions that need secure
comparison protocols [23] or high-order polynomials [15]. Therefore, their ac-
curacy and efficiency are limited. Delegating these plaintext computations to
server will not only improve our model accuracy, but also significantly improve
our model efficiency, as we will present in experiments. After this, the server
gets a final hidden layer (zL) and sends it back to the data holder who has label
to calculate prediction, where L is the total number of layers of the deep neural
network.
CG3: private label related computations on data holder. The data
holder who has label can compute prediction using the final hidden layer it
receives from the server. For node classification task, the Softmax activation
function is used for the output layer [16], which is defined as softmax(zc) =
1
Z exp(zc) with c ∈ C be the node class and Z =
∑
c exp(zc).
In the following subsections, we will describe three important components
of PPGNN, i.e., initial node embeddings generation in CG1, local node embed-
dings generation in CG2, and global node embedding generation in CG3.
3.2 Generate Initial Node Embeddings
Initial node embeddings are generated by using node features. Under vertically
partitioned data setting, each data holder has partial node features. Under
such setting, there are two methods for data holders to generate initial node
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Figure 3: Two methods of generating initial node embeddings.
embeddings, i.e., individually and collaboratively, as is shown in Figure 3.
The ‘individually ’ method means that data holders generate initial node em-
beddings using their own node features, individually. For data holder i ∈ P, this
can be done by hi0 = (x
i)
T ·Wi, where xi and Wi are node features and weight
matrix of data holder i. Although this method is simple and data holders do
not need to communicate with each other, it cannot capture the relationship be-
tween features of data holders and thus causes information loss. As the example
in Figure 3, data holder B generates its inital node embeddings using features f4
and f5, while data holder C generates its inital node embeddings using features
f6 and f7. That is, it assumes the features of B and C are independent, and
thus cannot capture the relation between them.
To solve the shortcoming of ‘individually ’ method, we propose the ‘collabora-
tively ’ method. It indicates that data holders generate initial node embeddings
using their node features, collaboratively, and meanwhile keep their private fea-
tures secure. Technically, this can be done by using cryptographic methods such
as secret sharing and homomorphic encryption [2]. In this paper, we choose ad-
ditive secret sharing (described in Section 2.3) due to its high efficiency. We
summarize the protocol in Algorithm 1. Traditionally, the initial node embed-
dings can be generated by h0 = x
T ·W, where x is node features and W is weight
matrix. When features are vertically partitioned, we calculate initial node em-
beddings as follows. First, we secretly share x among data holders (Lines 3-4).
Then, data holders concat their received shares in order (Line 5). After it, we
calculate xT ·W following distributive law (Lines 6, 8, and 9). Take two data
holders for example, xT ·W = (〈x〉1 + 〈x〉2) · (〈W〉1 + 〈W〉2) = 〈x〉1 · 〈W〉1
+ 〈x〉1 ·〈W〉2+〈x〉2 ·〈W〉1+〈x〉2 ·〈W〉2. Finally, data holders reconstruct xT ·W
by summing over all the shares (Lines 13-15). The security can be proved by
following the real world and ideal world simulation based approach [19], similar
as SecureML [23].
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Algorithm 1: Data holders P securely generate the initial node embed-
dings using secret sharing
Input: {xiv ∈ Z2` ,∀v ∈ V,∀i ∈ P}, and xi for short
Output: The share of initial node embeddings for each data holder i
{h0v(i), i ∈ P,∀v ∈ V}
1 for Pi ∈ P in parallel do
2 Pi randomly initializes 〈W〉i
3 Pi locally generates
{〈
xi
〉
j
}
j∈P
4 Pi distributes
{〈
xi
〉
j
}
j 6=i
to others
5 Pi concats
{〈
xk
〉
j
}
j∈P
and get 〈x〉i
6 Pi locally calculates 〈x〉Ti · 〈W〉i as i-share
7 for Pj ∈ P and j 6= i do
8 Pi and Pj calculate i-share
〈
〈x〉Ti · 〈W〉j
〉
i
and j-share〈
〈x〉Ti · 〈W〉j
〉
j
using secret sharing
9 Pi and Pj calculate i-share
〈
〈x〉Tj · 〈W〉i
〉
i
and j-share〈
〈x〉Tj · 〈W〉i
〉
j
using secret sharing
10 for Pi ∈ P in parallel do
11 Pi locally calculates the summation of all i-shares, denoted as〈
h0v
〉
i
=
〈
xT ·w〉
i
12 Pi sends
〈
h0v
〉
i
to Pj , ∀j ∈ P, j 6= i
13 Pi reconstructs h0v, denote as h0v(i)
14 return h0v(i) for each data holder i ∈ P
3.3 Generate Local Node Embeddings
We generate local node embeddings by using multi-hop neighborhood aggre-
gation on graphs, based on inital node embeddings. Note that, unlike existing
GNNs that perform neighborhood aggregation using the centralized data, under
data isolated setting, neighborhood aggregation should be done by data holders
separately, rather than cooperatively, to protect the private edge information.
This is because one may infer the neighboorhoold information of v given the
neighborhood aggregation results of k-hop (hkv(i)) and k + 1-hop (h
k+1
v (i)), if
neighborhood aggregation is done by data holders together. A special case is
hkv(i) = h
k+1
v (i), where it is likely that v is an isolated node in the graph of
data holder i. Therefore, to protect graph privacy, we let data holders perform
multi-hop neighborhood aggregation separately using their own graphs.
For ∀v ∈ V at each data holder, neighborhood aggregation is the same as
the traditional GNN, as is shown in Figure 4. Take GraphSAGE [14], a general
inductive framework, for example, it introduces aggregator functions to update
hidden embeddings by sampling and aggregating features from a node’s local
8
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Figure 4: Generate local node embeddings by neighborhood aggregation.
neighborhood:
hkN (v) ← AGGk({hk−1u ,∀u ∈ N (v)}),
hkv ← (Wk · CONCAT(hk−1v ,hkN (v))),
(1)
where we follow the same notations as GraphSAGE, and the aggregator func-
tions AGG are of three types, i.e., Mean, LSTM, and Pooling. Since our pro-
posed PPGNN learning framework is suitable for any existing GNN models,
without loss of generality, in this paper, we will take GraphSAGE as a typical
GNN case and present how to make it secure in data isolated setting. After it,
data holders send local node embeddings to a semi-honest server for combination
and further non-private data related computations.
3.4 Generate Global Node Embeddings
The server combines the local node embeddings from data holders and gets
global node embeddings. The combination strategy would be trainable and
maintaining high representational capacity. We design three combination strate-
gies.
Concat. The concat operator can fully preserve local node embeddings learnt
from different data holders. That is, Line 14 in Algorithm 2 becomes
hkv ← CONCAT(hkv(1),hkv(2), ...,hkv(I)). (2)
Mean. The mean operator takes the elementwise mean of the vectors in
({hkv(i),∀i ∈ P}), assuming data holders contribute equally to the global node
embeddings, i.e.,
hkv ← MEAN(hkv(1) ∪ hkv(2) ∪ ... ∪ hkv(I)). (3)
Regression. The above two strategies treat data holders equally. In reality,
the local node embeddings from different data holder may contribute diversely
to the global node embeddings. We propose a Regression strategy to handle
this kind of situation. The regression operator aims to combine the embedding
elements from data holders through a regression model, whose parameters are
learnt intelligently during training. Let ωi be the weight vector of local node
embeddings from data holder i ∈ P, then
hkv ← ω1  hkv(1) + ω2  hkv(2)...+ ωI  hkv(I), (4)
where  is element-wise multiplication. Regression can handle the situation
where the data quality and quantity (feature and edge size) of data holders are
different from each other.
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These different combination operators can utilize local node embeddings in
diverse ways, and we will empirically study their effects on model performances
in experiments.
Algorithm 2: Privacy preserving GraphSAGE for node label prediction
(forward propagation)
Input: Graph G(V, E i) and node features {xiv,∀v ∈ V} on data holder
i, i ∈ P = {1, ..., I}; depth K; aggregator functions
AGGk,∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}; weight matrices
Wki ,∀i ∈ P,∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}; max layer L; weight matrices
Wl,∀l ∈ {0, ..., L}; non-linearity σ; neighborhood functions
N i : v → 2V ,∀i ∈ P; node labels on data holder p ∈ P and c ∈ C
Output: Node label predictions {yˆvc,∀v ∈ V,∀c ∈ C} on data holder p
1 # CG1: private feature and edge related computations by data holders
2 Data holders: collaboratively calculate the initial node embeddings
h0v(i)← xiv,∀i ∈ P,∀v ∈ V, using Algorithm 1
3 for i ∈ P in parallel do
4 for k = 1 to K do
5 for v ∈ V do
6 Data holder: calculates hkN (v)(i)←
AGGk({hk−1u (i),∀u ∈ N i(v)})
7 Data holder: calculates hkv(i)← σ(Wki · CONCAT
(hk−1v (i),h
k
N (v)(i))
8 Data holder: calculates local node embeddings
hkv(i)← hkv(i)/||hkv(i)||2,∀v ∈ V and sends it to server
9 # CG2: non-private-data-related-computations by server
10 for v ∈ V do
11 Server: combines the local node embeddings from data holders hkv =
COMBINE ({hkv(i),∀i ∈ P})
12 Server: forward propagation based on the global node embeddings
zL = σ(WL−1 · σ(...σ(W0 · hkv)))
13 Server: sends zL to data holder p
14 # CG3: private label related computations by data holder who has label
15 Data holder p: makes prediction by
yˆvc ← softmax(WL · zL),∀v ∈ V,∀c ∈ C
3.5 Putting together
By combining thee sub-computational graphs (CG1-CG3) and the key com-
ponents described above, we complete the forward propagation of PPGNN. To
describe the procedures in details, we take GraphSAGE [14], a general induc-
tive GNN framework, for example and present its forward propagation process
in Algorithm 2. In it, Lines 2-8 denote CG1 on data holders, and particularly,
Line 2 (Algorithm 1) shows how data holders generate initial node embeddings
using node feature information collaboratively (Section 3.2), and Lines 3-8 de-
scribe how data holders generate local node embeddings separately (Section
3.3), i.e., perform multi-hop neighborhood aggregation using edge information.
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Note that Lines 3-8 can be replaced with the aggregation strategies of other ex-
isting GNNs, e.g., [14, 17, 30], to adapt them to our PPGNN learning paradigm.
Lines 10-13 are CG2 on server, where Line 11 shows how to generate global
node embeddings on server (Section 3.4). Line 12 shows how the server makes
forward propagation to get the last hidden layer. Line 15 shows how data holder
conduct CG3 using the last hidden layer.
3.6 Model learning
PPGNN can be learnt by gradient descent through minimizing the cross-entropy
error over all labeled training examples
L = −
∑
v∈Yv
∑
c∈C
yvcln(yˆvc), (5)
where Yv is the set of training nodes that have labels.
Specifically, the model weights of PPGNN are in four parts. The weights
for the initial node embeddings, i.e., 〈W〉i,∀i ∈ P, that are secretly shared by
data holders, the weights for neighborhoold aggregation on graphs, i.e., Wki , that
are also kept by data holders, the weights for the hidden layers of deep neural
networks, i.e., Wl, 0 ≤ l < L, that are hold by server, and the weights for the
output layer of deep neural networks, i.e., WL, that are hold by the data holder
who has label. These weights are trained using gradient descent. In this work,
we perform batch gradient descent, i.e., we use the full dataset in each iteration,
which is a viable option as long as dataset fits in memory. We leave memory-
efficient extensions with mini-batch gradient descent for future work. As can
be seen, in PPGNN, both private data and model are hold by data holders
themselves, thus the data privacy are guaranteed.
4 Experiments
We conduct experiments to answer the following questions:
• Q1: whether PPGNN outperforms the GNN models that are trained on the
isolated data.
• Q2: how does PPGNN behave comparing with the traditional insecure model
trained on the plaintext mixed data.
• Q3: how does PPGNN perform comparing with the naive solution in Section
1.
• Q4: are our proposed combination strategies effective to PPGNN.
• Q5: what is the effect of the number of data holders on PPGNN.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We first describe the datasets and comparison methods we use in our experi-
ments.
Datasets. We use three benchmark datasets, i.e., Cora, Pubmed, and Citeseer
[27]. They are popularly used to evaluate the performance of GNN. We use
exactly the same dataset partition of training, validate, and test following the
prior work [16]. Besides, in data isolated GNN setting, both node features and
11
Table 1: Dataset statistics.
Dataset #Node #Edge #Features #Classes
Cora 2,708 5,429 1,433 7
Pubmed 19,717 44,338 500 3
Citeseer 3,327 4,732 3,703 6
Table 2: Performance comparison on three datasets in terms of accuracy.
Dataset Cora Pubmed Citeseer
GraphSAGEA 0.6110 0.6720 0.5410
GraphSAGEB 0.6060 0.7030 0.4570
PPGNN C 0.7900 0.7740 0.6850
PPGNN M 0.8090 0.7810 0.6950
PPGNN R 0.8020 0.7820 0.6930
GraphSAGEA+B 0.8150 0.7910 0.7001
edges are hold by different parties. For all the experiments, we split the datasets
randomly, use five-fold cross validation and adopt accuracy as the evaluation
metric.
Comparison methods. We compare PPGNN with the GraphSAGE models
[14] that are trained using isolated data and mixed plaintext data to answer
Q1 and Q2. We also compare PPGNN with the naive solution described in
Section 1 to answer Q3. To answer Q4, we vary the proportion of data (both
features and edges) hold by A and B, and sutdy the performances of PPGNN
with different combination strategies. We vary the number of data holders in
PPGNN to answer Q5. For all these models, we choose Mean operator as the
aggregator function.
Parameter settings. For all the models, we use TanH as the active function
of neighbor propagation, and Sigmoid as the active function of hidden layers.
For the deep neural network on server, we set the dropout rate to 0.5 and net-
work structure as (d, d, |C|), where d ∈ {32, 64, 128} is the dimension of node
embeddings and |C| the nubmer of classes. Since we have too many compari-
son and ablation models, and they achieve the best performance with different
parameters, we cannot report all the best parameters. Instead, we report the
range of the best parameters. We vary the propagation depth K ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5},
L2 regularization in {10−2 − 10−4}, and learning rate in {10−2 − 10−3}. We
tune parameters based on the validate dataset and evaluate model performance
on the test dataset during five-fold cross validation.
4.2 Comparison Results and Analysis
To answer Q1-Q3, we assume there are two data holders (A and B) who have
equal number of node features and edges, i.e., the proportion of data held by A
and B is 5:5, and compare our models with GraphSAGEs that are trained on
isolated data individually and on mixed plaintext data. We summarize the re-
sults in Table 2, where PPGNN C, PPGNN M, and PPGNN R denote PPGNN
with Concat, Mean, and Regression combination strategies.
Result1: answer to Q1. We first compare PPGNNs with the GraphSAGEs
12
that are trained on isolated feature and edge data, i.e., GraphSAGEA and
GraphSAGEB. From Table 2, we find that, PPGNNs with different combina-
tion strategies can significantly improve the performance of GraphSAGEA and
GraphSAGEB on all the three datasets. Take Citeseer for example, PPGNN R
improves the accuracy of GraphSAGEA and GraphSAGEB by as high as 28.10%
and 51.64%.
Analysis of Result1. The reason of result1 is straightforward. GraphSAGEA
and GraphSAGEB can only use partial feature and edge information hold by
A and B, respectively. In contrast, PPGNNs provide a solution for A and
B to train GNNs collaboratively without compromising their own data. By
doing this, PPGNNs can use the information from the data of both A and B
simultaneously, and therefore achieve better performance.
Result2: answer to Q2. We then compare PPGNNs with GraphSAGE that is
trained on the mixed plaintext data, i.e., GraphSAGEA+B. It can be seen from
Table 2 that PPGNNs have comparable performance with GraphSAGEA+B,
e.g., 0.8090 vs. 0.8150 on Cora dataset and 0.6950 vs. 0.7001 on Citeseer
dataset.
Analysis of Result2. It is not hard to explain why our proposal has compa-
rable performance with the model that are trained on the mixed plaintext data.
First, we propose a secret sharing based protocol for A and B securely generate
the initial node embeddings from their node features, as described in Algorithm
2, which are the same as those generated by using mixed plaintext features.
Second, although A and B generate local node embeddings by using their own
edge data to do neighbor aggregation separately (for security concern), we pro-
pose different combination strategies to combine their local node embeddings.
Eventually, the edge information from both A and B are used for training the
classification model. Therefore, PPGNNs have comparable performance with
GraphSAGEA+B.
Result3: answer to Q3. In PPGNN, we delegate the non-private data related
computations to server. One would be curious about what if these computations
are also performed by data holders using existing secure neural network proto-
cols, i.e., SecureML [23]. To answer this question, we compare PPGNN with
the secure GNN model that is implemented using SecureML, which we call as
SecureML-GNN, where we use 3-degree Taylor expansion to approximate TanH
and Sigmoid. The accuracy and running time per epoch (in seconds) of PPGNN
vs. SecureML-GNN on Pubmed are 0.8090 vs. 0.7970 and 18.65 vs. 166.81,
respectively, where we use local area network.
Analysis of Result3. From the above comparison results, we find that our
proposed PPGNN learning paradigm not only achieves better accuracy, but also
has much better efficiency. This is because the non-private data related com-
putations involve non-linear functions that are not cryptographically friendly,
which are approximately calculated using time-consuming MPC techniques in
SecureML.
4.3 Ablation Study
We now study the effects of different combination operators and different num-
ber of data holders on PPGNN.
Result4: answer to Q4. Different combination operators can utilize local
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Table 3: Comparison of combination operators on Cora by varying the propor-
tion of data hold by A and B.
Model PPGNN C PPGNN M PPGNN R
Prop.=9:1 0.8085 0.8050 0.8090
Prop.=8:2 0.8015 0.7960 0.8070
Prop.=7:3 0.7925 0.7925 0.8030
Table 4: Comparison results on Cora by varying the number of DHs.
No. of DH PPGNN C PPGNN M PPGNN R
2 0.7900 0.8090 0.8020
3 0.7490 0.7740 0.7600
4 0.7120 0.7330 0.7220
node embeddings in diverse ways and make our proposed PPGNN adaptable
to different scenarios, we study this by varying the proportion (Prop.) of data
(node features and edges) hold by A and B in {9: 1, 8: 2, 7: 3}. The results on
Cora dataset are shown in Table 3.
Analysis of Result4. From Table 3, we find that with the proportion of data
hold byA and B being even, i.e., from {9: 1} to {7: 3}, the performances of most
strategies tend to decrease. This is because the neighbor aggregation is done by
data holders individually, and with a bigger proportion of data hold by a single
holder, it is more easier for this party to generate better local node embeddings.
Moreover, we also find that Mean operator works well when data are evenly
split, and Regression operator is good at handling the situations where data
holders have different quatity of data, since it treats the local node embeddings
from each data holder differently, and assigns weights to them intelligently.
Result5: answer to Q5. We vary the number of Data Holders (DHs) in {2,
3, 4} and study the performance of PPGNN. We report the results in Table 4,
where we use the Cora dataset and assume data holders have even feature and
edge data.
Analysis of Result5. From Table 4, we find that, as the number of data
holders increases, the accuracy of all the models decreases. This is because the
neighborhood aggregation in PPGNN is done by each holder individually for
privacy concern, and each data holder will have less edge data when there are
more data holders, since they split the original edge information evenly. There-
fore, when more participants are involved, more information are lost during the
neighborhood aggregation procedure.
5 Related Work
We review three kinds of existing Privacy Preserving Neural Network (PPNN)
models.
PPNN based on cryptographic methods. These methods mainly use cryp-
tographic techniques, e.g., secret sharing and homomorphic encryption, to build
approximated neural networks models [23, 32], since the nonlinear active func-
tions are not cryptographically computable. Cryptograph based neural network
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models are difficult to scale to deep networks and large datasets due to its high
communication and computation complexities. In this paper, we use crypto-
graphic techniques for data holders to calculate the initial node embeddings
securely.
PPNN based on differential privacy. These methods adopt differential pri-
vacy when training neural networks [29, 1]. The most common way is following
parameter server learning paradigm, that is data holders calculate model gradi-
ents, add noise in it, and send it to server for updating the global model. These
methods are efficient but fail to achieve promising performance when adding
too much noise. Moreover, differential privacy is difficult to be applied into
vertically partitioned data setting.
PPNN based on split computation graph. These methods split the com-
putation graph of neural networks into two parts, and let data holders calculate
the private data related computations individually and get a hidden layer, and
then let a server makes the rest computations [31, 8, 24, 13]. Our model differs
from them in mainly two aspects. First, we train a GNN rather than a neural
network. Seconds, we use cryptographic techniques for data holders to calculate
the initial node embeddings collaboratively rather than compute them based on
their plaintext data individually.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed a privacy-preserving GNN learning paradigm for node classifica-
tion task. We did this by splitting the computation graph of GNN. We left the
private data related computations on data holders and delegated the rest com-
putations to a server. Experiments on real world datasets demonstrate that our
model significantly outperforms the GNNs by using the isolated data and has
comparable performance with the traditional GNN by using the mixed plaintext
data insecurely.
In future, we would like to solve our problem using mini-batch gradient
descent. We are also interested in studying how to prevent attacks from server,
e.g., membership attack.
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